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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
O C T O B E R  3 0 ,  2 0 1 7  
Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of 
Place 
Naomi Schoenbaum  
abstract.  David Schleicher has written an important article on the relationship between
law and mobility, arguing for policymakers to be more concerned with policies that stand in the 
way of individuals moving to bigger, more productive cities. This Response takes up the costs of 
mobility for productivity, welfare, and sex equality omitted by Schleicher, and addresses Schlei-
cher’s treatment of place as a market. It argues that Schleicher’s argument fails to account for 
how mobility interacts with critical relationships. While Schleicher’s view of productivity is 
premised in agglomeration economics, he ignores how mobility ruptures the very relationships 
on which the benefits of agglomeration (and broader welfare metrics) depend. He also misses 
how moves o�en are not made by individuals, but rather by families, and neglects the fact that 
such moves o�en entail losses for women. Finally, Schleicher’s treatment of place as a market, 
where individuals should essentially move to the highest bidder, ignores how our attachments to 
places run far deeper than the labor market opportunities they afford. 
introduction 
Place is having a moment. Since the disorienting 2016 presidential election, 
place has emerged as one of the primary explanations for why Washington 
elites were so surprised by Trump’s victory: they were out of touch with voters 
in faraway and quite different places.1 Popular attention to place has been cap-
1. See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, President Trump: How America Got It So Wrong, ROLLING STONE (Nov.
10, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/president-trump-how-america
-got-it-so-wrong-w449783 [http://perma.cc/D3CT-GS5Z]; J.D. Vance, Life Outside the Lib-
eral Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election
-night-2016/life-outside-the-liberal-bubble [http://perma.cc/UP5Q-YS2N].
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062849 
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tured by unlikely bestsellers, like J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy,2 which are prem-
ised on the difference place makes in America.3 Legal scholars have increasingly 
emphasized how distinctions among different places affect legal questions.4 Re-
latedly, mobility, and especially mobility to certain types of places, has been 
presented as the answer to our economic woes.5 It is not surprising, then, that 
David Schleicher’s Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation6 
comes at this moment. Stuck! is sure to become a seminal legal treatment of 
place and mobility—topics at once both timely and timeless. 
I take Stuck!’s essential argument to be as follows: law distorts the market 
for moving to high-productivity places, and this is an undesirable outcome. For 
Schleicher, mobility is important not only for welfare and productivity, but also 
for macroeconomic goals like the effectiveness of a single American currency.7 
His concerns about stasis lie particularly with those whom he views as “stuck” 
in less productive areas, who he believes would reap rewards from moving to 
 
2. J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS (2016). 
3. Other recent attention-getting books on the importance of place in America include AMY 
GOLDSTEIN, JANESVILLE: AN AMERICAN STORY (2017); and ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, 
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016). 
4. See, e.g., Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2934481 [http://perma.cc/39PL-YYWJ]; Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2927714 [http://perma.cc/ENL5-SAHP]; David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029180 [http://perma.cc/6A7G 
-B4QW]; David Fontana, The Geography of Campaign Finance Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3008378 [http://perma.cc/A7V8-SP6L] 
[hereina�er Fontana, Geography]. 
5. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, The Unseen Threat to America: We Don’t Leave Our Hometowns, TIME 
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://time.com/4677919/tyler-cowen-book/?xid=time_socialflow_twitter 
[http://perma.cc/4VRL-W54L]; Kevin D. Williamson, Chaos in the Family, Chaos in the 
State: The White Working Class’s Dysfunction, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 17, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/432876/donald-trump-white-working-class-dysfunction 
-real-opportunity-needed-not-trump [http://perma.cc/6X7X-XCN5]. 
6. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78 
(2017). 
7. Id. at 83 (“[T]he stickiness of America’s internal labor market is a fundamental macroeco-
nomic problem that influences the quality of monetary policy, overall economic output and 
growth, and the efficacy of federal safety net spending.”). 
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more productive areas.8 Schleicher argues for policymakers to be more mindful 
of the ways in which law may distort labor markets by impeding mobility.9 
With respect to the descriptive portion of his claim, Schleicher is appropri-
ately circumspect about the causal relationship between law and recent declines 
in mobility,10 particularly in light of research rebutting legal explanations for 
the phenomenon and suggesting an alternative explanation.11 Nonetheless, 
Schleicher assigns some blame to law for the relative stasis of the American 
people.12 Note that the research is currently inconclusive on Schleicher’s view 
of law’s causal role in this reduced movement, as Schleicher identifies a broader 
set of laws that impact mobility—including, for example, public benefits laws 
and municipal bankruptcy law—than the research has considered to this 
point.13 Further, even if the laws that Schleicher faults for our declining mobili-
 
8. Id. at 82 (“More troubling still, Americans are no longer moving from poor regions to rich 
ones.”). As Schleicher acknowledges, the data is disputed as to whether lower-skilled work-
ers make fewer interstate moves or whether they are just less likely to move to rich markets. 
See id. at 116 n.157. 
9. See, e.g., id. at 126 (expressing concern about policies that could distort incentives to move 
and thus create a “mismatch between the ‘natural’ needs of the labor market and the supply 
of labor”). 
10. Id. at 84 (explaining that “[i]t is not clear whether these legal changes caused declines in 
mobility, or simply failed to push back against ‘natural’ changes that reduced mobility,” and 
citing studies that assign causation to reasons other than law). Law’s relationship to long-
distance mobility is more mixed than Schleicher suggests. Whole areas of law might be seen 
as pro-mobility. Employment law, for example, greases the wheels for labor-market mobili-
ty: the portability of employer-provided health insurance, antidiscrimination laws, unem-
ployment insurance, and even at-will employment all make it easier to move long distances 
for a better job. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1177-87 
(2012). Once one recognizes, as Schleicher rightly does, that so many laws and policies im-
pact mobility directly or indirectly, see, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 6, at 111 n.143, it is quite 
hard to identify the net impact of law on mobility. 
11. See, e.g., Raven Molloy et al., Declining Migration Within the U.S.: The Role of the Labor Mar-
ket (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20065, 2014), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w20065.pdf [http://perma.cc/23AM-4ZCC] [hereina�er Molloy et al., Declining 
Migration] (attributing declining mobility to changes in the labor market itself, specifically 
to declining labor market fluidity); Raven Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in 
the U.S. Labor Market, 2016 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 221-23, http://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/molloytextspring16bpea.pdf [http://perma
.cc/B58Z-XQMX] [hereina�er Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity] (rejecting 
housing or labor market regulations as explanations for declining labor market fluidity). 
12. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 84-85 (“[S]tate and local policies in part dictate where people 
move, particularly by keeping people out of the richest metropolitan areas and best job mar-
kets . . . . [S]tate, local, and federal laws therefore bear some responsibility for declining in-
terstate mobility.”). 
13. Compare id. at 78 (noting that “legal barriers to interstate mobility” include “[l]and-use laws 
and occupational licensing regimes,” “[d]ifferent eligibility standards for public benefits, 
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ty are not to blame, policymakers might be able to better spur mobility by us-
ing different laws and policies. For these reasons, I set aside Schleicher’s descrip-
tive claim and focus this Response on the article’s normative stance: how poli-
cymakers should approach policies that impact location decisions, assuming 
that they can effectively do so. 
Schleicher and I agree on three main points: first, place and mobility mat-
ter; second, policymakers too infrequently consider place and mobility; and 
third, relationships are critical for productivity. Despite these points of agree-
ment, there is much that I find missing from Schleicher’s account. Schleicher’s 
aim of moving people from low-productivity places to high-productivity places 
relies on mistaken premises about the significance of both mobility and place. 
As for the significance of mobility,14 Schleicher fails to appreciate how, because 
we o�en move in nuclear family units, mobility ruptures relationships outside 
these units that prove critical for our productivity15 and our happiness16—and 
how, due to gendered family dynamics in heterosexual couples, the gains mo-
bility does produce are distributed in sex-unequal ways.17 As for the signifi-
cance of place, Schleicher may overstate the value of place for productivity 
while at the same time ignoring the value of place for general welfare, politics, 
and a host of other considerations.18 
This Response proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I explain Schleicher’s view 
of location decisions as a market for place. In Parts II and III, I argue that this 
stance leads Schleicher to err with regard to the costs of mobility and the value 
of place, respectively. 
 
public employee pension policies, homeownership subsidies, state and local tax regimes,” 
“basic property law rules,” “building codes, mobile home bans, federal location-based subsi-
dies, legal constraints on knocking down houses, and the problematic structure of Chapter 9 
municipal bankruptcy”), with Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity, supra note 11, at 
221-23 (addressing “regulation of land use and business practices,” relying on composite rat-
ings of regulation to assess the relationship between regulation and mobility, and separately 
rejecting occupational licensing as a causal factor). 
14. For an article-length treatment of the costs of mobility and their relationship to employment 
law and family law, see Schoenbaum, supra note 10. 
15. See infra Section II.A. 
16. See infra Section II.B. 
17. See infra Section II.C. 
18. See infra Section III. 
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i .  a market for place  
Schleicher thinks it is a “problem[]” that people are currently “stuck” in 
relatively unproductive places.19 He suggests that more of these people should 
move to more productive places,20 and he argues that doing so “would substan-
tially increase economic activity and welfare.”21 Given these benefits, he does 
not think that the people who are stuck (or anyone else) would have any inter-
est in their staying put.22 
Schleicher’s view of the importance of place stems from agglomeration eco-
nomics. As Schleicher explains, agglomeration economics focuses on proximi-
ty’s role in productivity.23 When people and capital come together geograph-
ically, they can exchange things and ideas more easily, and this produces wealth 
and economic growth.24 Three mechanisms generate these gains: (1) a reduc-
tion in shipping costs for goods; (2) the advantages of deep markets; and (3) 
information spillovers between neighbors.25 Given that the cost of transporting 
goods has dropped but the cost of transporting people remains high, the pri-
mary benefits of agglomeration are now the benefits of co-locating people: 
deep labor and consumption markets, and information spillovers inside and 
between industries.26 Therefore, according to Schleicher, increasing the ability 
of people to move to dense boomtowns would increase gains through agglom-
eration.27 
Importantly, in describing the benefits of agglomeration, Schleicher relies 
not only on the fact that people are brought together in the same places, but 
that these persons develop relationships that allow information to be shared.28 
As he explains: 
 
19. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 86. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 83 (speaking favorably of “[i]ncreasing interstate migration rates, and particu-
larly moves to rich regions”); id. at 152-53 (proposing mobility incentive programs). 
21. Id. at 83. 
22. Id. at 143 (“It is not clear why the country as a whole or a state in particular should want res-
idents to remain in, say, Atlantic City rather than move to the New York City suburbs, 
which would give them access to a better labor market.”). 
23. Id. at 96-97. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. at 97. 
26. See id. at 100. 
27. See id. at 101-02. 
28. See id. at 103 (“More frequent interactions between people can lead to new ideas, and these 
ideas drive economic growth.”). 
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In Silicon Valley, for example, so�ware developers and venture capital-
ists learn just by having coffee with friends. A tech savant in Jackson-
ville, Florida would have no such opportunity to learn from peers. Lob-
byists in D.C. learn from one another over dinner in Capitol Hill, 
becoming better at their jobs with each bit of gossip or scrap of insight 
into legislative procedure. Wall Street types learn about how to struc-
ture deals over steaks and cocktails at The 21 Club.29 
Schleicher views location choice through the lens of a market for matching 
people with place. To maximize productivity, Schleicher wants to move people 
to the most productive places. He importantly, and rightly, emphasizes the role 
of certain market relations for productivity. But he stops short of recognizing 
the full role of relationships for productivity, general welfare, and the distribu-
tion of economic gains and losses, as well as how mobility affects these rela-
tionships. 
For Schleicher, relationships matter only for the economic gains they bring 
rather than for the other benefits they might confer or the value they may have 
even in their own right. He does say a few words about the noneconomic ben-
efits of relationships, but these benefits feature nowhere in his policy prescrip-
tions.30 Because Schleicher focuses on the economic impact of relationships, 
only certain relationships—a subset of market relations—end up mattering, 
while the rest, including the family, are ignored. Even when it comes to market 
relations, Schleicher fails to appreciate how their disruption through mobility 
undermines their economic function. Moreover, under his view, place matters 
only for the proximity it provides to other economic actors. Place, rather than 
constituting a meaningful community, is fungible. 
This circumscribed view of relationships means that Schleicher misses the 
full costs, economic and otherwise, of his proposal. First, as to the costs of mo-
bility, Schleicher criticizes other agglomerationists for wrongly assuming fric-
 
29. Id. at 100. The fact that these examples are all stereotypically masculine might suggest some-
thing about whom Schleicher envisions as the prototypical mover. The gendered dimen-
sions of mobility are discussed infra Section II.C. 
30. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 109 (“Beyond generating wealth through increased invest-
ment, geographic stability may support the development of beneficial social values and rela-
tionships. Stable communities can strengthen intergenerational bonds, with grandparents 
living near grandchildren. Long-term friendships may be more likely to endure in stable 
communities than in transient ones. In such communities, social capital can more easily de-
velop.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 123 (“We make friends, build social networks, and raise 
our families where we live.”). 
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tionless or near-frictionless labor mobility.31 But he fails to consider the fric-
tions that arise from relationships. The importance of strong local ties means 
that mobility can undermine productivity and broader welfare metrics. And the 
fact that we move in family units means that mobility imposes undesirable 
gendered distributional consequences. 
Second, as to the value of place, Schleicher fails to see how the spillovers 
celebrated by agglomerationists are not just economic, but also political and 
ideological.32 Places, in other words, are particular. This means that moving 
people from one place to another can have a significant impact on general wel-
fare, as well as for politics. This broader significance of place might mean that 
we do not want to treat it just like any other market good. 
i i .  the costs of mobility  
This Part spells out the costs of mobility that Schleicher overlooks due to 
his inattention to the impact of mobility on our relationships, both inside and 
outside the family. First, Schleicher fails to appreciate how mobility can reduce 
productivity by breaking the ties that generate it. Second, Schleicher fails to 
consider how mobility can undermine other aspects of welfare promoted by 
place-based relationships. Third, Schleicher fails to account for the dispropor-
tionate costs that an emphasis on long-distance mobility imposes on women. 
A. Productivity 
As Schleicher quite rightly recognizes, relationships between people, and 
especially geographically proximate relationships, are essential for productivity. 
But precisely because of the importance of these relationships, mobility can un-
dermine productivity by weakening and even breaking these ties. Mobility has 
productivity costs both for a person’s original location, which has lost part of its 
network, and for that person’s new location, as regenerating ties takes time. 
This Section explains how mobility harms productivity as a result. 
 
31. See id. at 101 (noting that agglomeration models assume that “firms and people can cheaply 
and easily move their base of location,” and thus “[w]hen there is local economic growth, 
people move in”). 
32. Schleicher cites Alfred Marshall as the canonical exponent of agglomeration economics. Id. 
at 97. Marshall’s theory of spillovers also explains how places differ across important dimen-
sions, including politically. See Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 107 n.24 (explaining that 
when people are physically proximate “‘[t]he mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; 
but are as it were in the air’”) (quoting ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271 
(8th ed. 1920)). 
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Agglomerationists like Schleicher are insufficiently attentive to the nature 
of the ties that promote particular types of productivity. Sociologists have dis-
tinguished between “weak” and “strong” ties. Weak ties concern those who are 
essentially acquaintances, while strong ties involve closer friends.33 Weak ties 
serve important functions in the market and otherwise, by transmitting simple 
information (like job opportunities) and linking together networks of similar 
weak ties.34 But there are some things that only strong ties can do. Strong ties 
are based in reciprocity and trust, and thus allow for exchange and reliance in 
the absence of formal contract.35 This closer relationship allows strong ties to 
transmit complex and sensitive information.36 
As a result, strong ties, both within and outside a worker’s firm, are critical 
for productivity. Schleicher’s description of the benefits of agglomeration rec-
ognizes this. Recall the “so�ware developers and venture capitalists [who] 
learn just by having coffee with friends,” the “[l]obbyists in D.C. [who] learn 
from one another over dinner in Capitol Hill,” and the “Wall Street types 
[who] learn about how to structure deals over steaks and cocktails at The 21 
Club.”37 
Even beyond agglomeration economics, economic sociology recognizes the 
role of strong ties in productivity.38 Inside the workplace, coworkers provide 
access to information, power, and opportunities, all of which enhance perfor-
mance.39 Strong workplace ties promote commitment to the firm, which in-
creases organizational citizenship behavior, loyalty, and willingness to give back 
 
33. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973) (describing 
the “intuitive notion of the ‘strength’ of an interpersonal tie” as a function of “the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services 
which characterize the tie”). 
34. Id. at 1360. 
35. See Edward Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. F437, F437 
(2002). 
36. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 
201, 218-19 (1983). 
37. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 100. 
38. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY 242 (2011) (re-
viewing the literature and concluding that “intimacy within an organization fosters job satis-
faction, enhances commitment of workers to the organization, facilitates communication 
among workers, and supports mutual aid in the performance of essential organizational 
tasks”). For work bringing this literature into legal scholarship, see Naomi Schoenbaum, 
The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167 (2015) [hereina�er Schoenbaum, Intimate 
Work]; Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605 (2017) [here-
ina�er Schoenbaum, Coworkers]. 
39. See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 612-14. 
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to the employer.40 Strong workplace ties also provide emotional support and 
care that can contribute to performance.41 Strong ties with coworkers even 
serve as a bulwark against workplace harassment, and can help workers better 
cope with harassment or mistreatment if it occurs.42 From call center workers 
to security analysts, strongly tied coworkers outperform their peers,43 and this 
success accrues to the firm.44 
Apart from coworkers, close work relationships with customers and even 
with competitors are also important for productivity.45 As I have addressed in 
prior work on intimate relationships between workers and customers, these re-
lationships lead workers and customers alike “to act altruistically,” performing 
additional work to support one another and sharing private information that 
aids in work success.46 Strong ties between workers and customers support 
price premiums, decrease employee training costs, and reduce turnover, all of 
 
40. See id. (collecting studies); ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 242-48 (same). 
41. See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 613; ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 246 (conclud-
ing, based on a range of research documenting the significance of emotional support ex-
changed by coworkers, that “[w]ithout such close personal ties, we can infer, many work-
places, far from operating more efficiently, would actually collapse”). 
42. See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 621-25 (citing studies). 
43. See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 252 (finding that “a surprising variety of studies docu-
ment the positive effects of workplace intimate relationships on economic productivity”); 
Susan Ellingwood, The Collective Advantage, GALLUP BUS. J. (Sept. 15, 2001), http://www
.gallup.com/businessjournal/787/collective-advantage.aspx [http://perma.cc/E7RZ-LYVU] 
(citing a large poll finding a strong correlation across firms between the proportion of work-
ers with on-the-job “best friends” and the firm’s profitability and productivity); Boris 
Groysberg et al., The Risky Business of Hiring Stars, HARV. BUS. REV. 1 (2004) (finding that 
standout performance by security analysts relies substantially on collaboration with col-
leagues such that stars frequently experience declines in productivity a�er switching firms); 
Benjamin N. Waber et al., Productivity Through Coffee Breaks: Changing Social Networks by 
Changing Break Structure, MASS. INST. TECH. MEDIA LAB. (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1586375 [http://perma.cc/N8YV-UDJL] (finding, in a study of call center workers, that 
the strength of a worker’s social group was positively related to productivity in the form of 
average call handle time); Lynn Wu et al., Mining Face-To-Face Interaction Networks Using 
Sociometric Badges: Predicting Productivity in an IT Configuration Task, INT’L CONFERENCE IN-
FO. SYS. (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130251 [http://perma.cc/XQ48-ZWUJ] (finding 
that workers at an information technology company who completed tasks within a tight-
knit group that communicated face to face were about 30% more productive than those who 
did not communicate in a face-to-face network). 
44. ZELIZER, supra note 38, at 242 (reviewing literature and concluding that intimacy “promotes 
organizational performance”). 
45. See id. at 243 (collecting citations finding the importance of friendship among contractors 
and “even putative competitors”). 
46. Schoenbaum, Intimate Work, supra note 38, at 1180. 
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which contributes to higher profits.47 Strong ties can lead to lower interest 
rates on loans and lower billing rates from corporate lawyers to their clients.48 
And strong ties outside of work matter for productivity, too. Whether through 
the market or personal relationships, strong ties support caregiving for chil-
dren, the elderly, or the disabled, which is crucial for workplace productivity, 
especially for women.49 Even for someone who is unemployed and thus with-
out strong coworker ties, these other strong work and nonwork ties can pro-
vide the connections and care that enable that person to find a new job. 
Mobility undermines strong ties because, as Schleicher recognizes, place 
matters. People bound by stronger ties tend to live nearer to one another.50 
Physical proximity is key to exchanges of support across strong ties.51 Assis-
tance and frequency of contact increase when people are within close geograph-
ic range.52 Technology has not changed the importance of proximity in realiz-
ing the benefits of strong ties. Despite email, Facebook, and even phone calls, 
distance weakens relationships.53 While the internet helps to maintain contact 
with weak ties, relationships’ sensitivity to distance has been similar pre- and 
post-internet, and a person’s most active ties are still nearby.54 Facebook and 
other “friendships” maintained through technology have little in common with 
true friendship: they are devoid of the closeness that is the hallmark of a strong 
tie.55 
 
47. Id. at 1181. 
48. Id. 
49. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1195-96. 
50. Id. at 1196-97. 
51. See id.; M. Mahdi Roghanizad & Vanessa K. Bohns, Ask in Person: You’re Less Persuasive Than 
You Think Over Email, 69 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 224 (2017) (finding far high-
er response rates when soliciting participation when solicitation is face-to-face rather than 
via email); Wu et al., supra note 43, at 16. 
52. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1169; see also Alan R. Teo et al., Does Mode of Contact with 
Different Types of Social Relationships Predict Depression in Older Adults? Evidence from a Na-
tionally Representative Survey, 63 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2014, 2019-21 (2015) (finding that 
in-person contact reduces risk of depression far more than phone or email contact). 
53. See Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of the Internet?, 47 URB. STUD. 2747, 
2750, 2778 (2010) (explaining that the telephone and the internet tend to “work synergisti-
cally with face-to-face contact” to supplement rather than replace it, and that e-mail fre-
quently serves to arrange visits and calls). 
54. Id. at 2775, 2779-80. 
55. See SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND 
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (2011); William Deresiewicz, Faux Friendship, CHRON. REV.  
(Dec. 6, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/Faux-Friendship/49308 [http://perma.cc
/CTA2-9D2K]. 
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Strong times require time to generate.56 When a worker moves, those in 
the original location suffer the loss of a strong tie until they develop a new one, 
and the mover similarly suffers the loss of strong ties until she too develops 
new ones. The long-distance mover loses not only her coworkers, but also her 
local professional circle. Upon starting work in the new location, the mover will 
be considered an “outsider” who does not have the legitimacy to reap the bene-
fits of strong ties.57 The stress of the move itself and the time spent rebuilding 
ties also cuts into the mover’s productivity.58 This all makes it harder to per-
form optimally in the new workplace, at least for some time.59 
Firms suffer too. Strong ties create a network of coworkers, customers, con-
tractors, and consultants that benefit the firm. These networks form structural-
ly embedded relations—basically, an intricate web of routinized transactions 
that reduce transaction costs, saving time and money.60 Moving imposes the 
loss of a departing employee’s relationships and routines, adding to turnover 
and training costs.61 While a firm might still benefit from its connections to a 
former employee through referrals and the like, these benefits wane when an 
employee is no longer in the firm’s local professional community. 
B. General Welfare 
Mobility’s impact on strong ties has broader effects on welfare beyond the 
economic.62 Strong ties communicate feelings of value and a sense of “be-
 
56. See Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, supra note 33, at 1361 (explaining that tie strength 
turns expressly on “the amount of time” the parties have been tied, as well as things that 
tend to take time to develop, such as “emotional intensity,” “intimacy (mutual confiding),” 
and “reciprocal services”). 
57. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1209. 
58. Id. at 1207-08. 
59. See Groysberg et al., supra note 43, at 2 (finding declines in productivity in high-performing 
security analysts a�er switching firms for this reason). 
60. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1206. 
61. Id. at 1206-07. 
62. I do not mean to suggest that strong ties bring only benefits. Strong ties bring not just more 
support, but also more demands. The demands of strong ties are especially concerning for 
low-income populations, for whom strong ties may crowd out the development of weak ties 
and their particular benefits, and for women, who are disproportionately burdened by the 
demands of strong ties. There are features of strong ties, like returns to scale and intercon-
nectivity, that guard against their burdens. For further discussion weighing the costs and 
benefits of strong ties, see id. at 1197-98. My point here is that even with the costs of strong 
ties, policymakers should consider the damage to strong ties that long-distance mobility 
imposes. 
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long[ing] to a network of communication and mutual obligation.”63 They 
promote self-esteem and happiness, as well as physical and mental health.64 
They also define who we are by helping to maintain a consistent sense of iden-
tity throughout one’s life course.65 
Strong ties also play a critical role in supporting caregiving. The majority of 
children under school age receive care from sources beyond their parents, 
whether from nonmarket strong ties, such as extended family, or from market 
strong ties, such as daycare teachers.66 Strong ties also provide essential care for 
the elderly and disabled.67 Beyond the care they provide to dependents, strong 
ties also provide emotional support to primary caregivers, disproportionately 
women.68 A grandmother may not only provide essential care for a grandchild, 
but also for the grandchild’s mother, by serving as a sounding board and 
providing advice. Mobility most jeopardizes this type of strong-tie support for 
precisely those low-wage persons Schleicher thinks should be moving more. It 
is those with the fewest resources who rely the most on nonmarket caregivers 
(family members and friends), and who would have the hardest time replacing 
these caregivers in a faraway location.69 
Schleicher does reference some of the “beneficial social values and relation-
ships” associated with stability.70 He assigns little value to them because, to 
him, “[t]he large majority of gains from population stability are captured by 
the communities in which people stay put and not by the rest of the nation.”71 
It is difficult to calculate the positive impact of strong ties, such as decreased 
healthcare costs, the value of care provided, sheer happiness, and so on. But 
several points are worth noting. First, some of these gains, like decreased 
healthcare costs, benefit the nation as a whole. Second, the communities where 
people stay put—which are all across the country—are part of the nation. Final-
 
63. Id. at 1195 (quoting Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 655 (2007)). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. See id. 
67. See Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-
First Century, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2007) (describing households “usher[ing] workers 
into their homes to help care for aging family members” and disabled family members). 
68. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1195-96. 
69. Id. 
70. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 109 (“[G]eographic stability may support the development of 
beneficial social values and relationships. Stable communities can strengthen intergenera-
tional bonds, with grandparents living near grandchildren. Long-term friendships may be 
more likely to endure in stable communities than in transient ones.” (footnotes omitted)); 
id. at 123 (“We make friends, build social networks, and raise our families where we live.”). 
71. Id. at 111. 
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ly, to the extent that Schleicher argues that we should or even can avoid the fact 
that the benefits of stasis accrue to the communities where people stay put, he 
misses the point. The benefits of a community of strong ties come precisely 
from the fact that it is rooted in place. 
Finally, there may be different moving “types”—those who significantly in-
vest in community would stand to lose more a�er a move than those who do 
not. These costs may be endogenous: if you are a “moving” type, you will not 
invest in community, and you will reduce the losses associated with mobility; if 
you are a “community” type, you will invest, and you will stand to lose more. 
And it may be that precisely those persons that Schleicher thinks should move 
more are community types—either by necessity72 or by choice—for whom 
moving would be especially costly. 
C. Distribution 
Schleicher’s emphasis on the importance of certain market relationships 
further means he ignores a crucial aspect of moving: we o�en do not do it 
alone. Rather, we frequently move in family units.73 When dual-income heter-
osexual couples move long distances for employment purposes, the spouses 
usually do not both accrue employment advantages. Rather, there is typically a 
spouse whose work is advantaged by the move (the driving spouse) and a 
spouse who may have either no job or a worse job in the new location (the 
trailing spouse).74 
While moving destroys economically relevant strong ties even for the driv-
ing spouse, it also typically provides economic benefits to that person, as well 
as an opportunity to recreate these ties over time. Because the trailing spouse 
typically does not enjoy employment benefits from the move and may be un-
employed in the new location, her opportunities to regenerate strong ties are 
hampered.75 Over time, the relative distribution of moving costs and benefits 
within the family becomes more lopsided.76 The benefits the driving spouse 
 
72. See supra note 69 and accompanying text on the greater negative impact of mobility on 
those who rely on nonmarket strong-tie support. 
73. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1187-93 (explaining how the law plays a role in this). 
While my focus here is on other adults within a family, children may also disproportionately 
bear the costs of mobility. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 111 & n.141 (citing a study showing 
higher adult suicide rates for those who moved as children); Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 
1196 (noting that children benefit from stable strong ties that are ruptured by mobility). 
74. The alternatives of a long-distance marriage or long-distance commuting have their own 
costs. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1214. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. at 1215. 
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gains and the losses the trailing spouse suffers tend to set up relative invest-
ments in work and family (with the driving spouse investing more in work and 
the trailing spouse investing more in family) that only further compound the 
impact of the move.77 
These family mobility dynamics have gendered consequences. In opposite-
sex couples, husbands tend to drive, and wives tend to trail.78 Wives are not 
only more likely to be the trailing spouse when a family moves, but they them-
selves are also less likely to relocate for enhanced employment opportunities.79 
This results in dramatic income differentials between husbands and wives in 
heterosexual couples. Whereas long-distance mobility enhances husbands’ ca-
reers, mobility brings lower levels of employment and income growth for 
wives.80 When these couples move, the income gap between husbands and 
wives widens substantially, on average to nearly $3,000.81 Indeed, the impact 
of a move is similar to the birth of a child on husbands’ and wives’ relative 
earnings.82 Even a small income gap can grow quite wide over time.83 
Importantly, evidence supports the existence of this trend—that opposite-
sex couples give priority to husbands’ careers in making relocation decisions—
even when controlling for human capital investments.84 Wives’ earning poten-
tial has little influence on the effect of mobility on their employment, and, un-
like men, mobility decreases women’s likelihood of employment.85 Indeed, 
women who are most committed to work—both those who work long hours 
and those who are their family’s sole earner—face the greatest earnings penalty 
from family mobility because they have the most to lose.86 Therefore, sex, apart 
from purely economic calculations, plays a significant role in relocation deci-
sions. As a result, we should be worried that mobility subsidies of the sort that 
 
77. See id. 
78. See id. (finding that husbands’ jobs are more likely to determine residential location, and 
wives are more likely to leave a job to accommodate a partner’s job change). Existing re-
search is on heterosexual couples. Gay and lesbian couples may develop the same dynamics 
of a driving and trailing spouse for the reasons explained above, without the same gendered 
consequences. Cf. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
721 (2012) (arguing that the law of marriage continues to encourage role-specialization of 
spouses, even though it now does so in a sex-neutral way). 
79. Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1215-16. 
80. Id. at 1216. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1217. 
84. Id. at 1216. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1216-17. 
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Schleicher proposes would compromise not only gender equality, but also effi-
cient location decisions. 
Schleicher acknowledges the possibility of mobility’s “doleful distributional 
consequences inside families,” but suggests that such consequences would be 
far more (or perhaps entirely) palatable if the gains that husbands tend to ac-
crue from mobility were shi�ed to wives to make up for the losses they tend to 
suffer.87 While Schleicher does not spell out what form this would take, we 
might imagine that a�er a move to a place where a husband gets a better job 
and a wife ends up unemployed, the husband shi�s something of value to the 
wife, which could be money (e.g., buying her a car), time (e.g., doing the 
laundry), or authority (e.g., letting her choose their vacation). 
Schleicher says that “[t]o know how costs are borne among family mem-
bers, we would need to know a lot more about the state of negotiating power 
inside families and how it affects other aspects of interfamilial negotiation.”88 
Everything we know about the gendered distribution of resources within the 
family should make us skeptical that the gains and losses mobility generates 
are, or will be, redistributed to alleviate their gendered impact.89 If anything, 
we should expect that the work benefits that husbands disproportionately gain 
a�er a move will make them more likely to continue accruing such gains, and 
that the losses that wives disproportionately suffer a�er a move will make them 
more likely to continue suffering such losses, only enhancing the lopsidedness 
of the spouses’ bargaining power.90 And even if a wife’s workplace losses were 
offset by gains inside the family, many marriages end in divorce, where these 
 
87. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 110 & n.139 (“It should be noted that these costs do not neces-
sarily match actual ‘incidence’ inside families, any more than an employer paying a payroll 
tax rather than an employee means that the employer bears the economic cost of the tax.”). 
88. Id. at 110 n.139. 
89. See Amartya K. Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN 
AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123, 124-26 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) (noting that intrafamily di-
visions of resources o�en disfavor women’s well-being because, among other reasons, wom-
en’s contribution to family (non-market) production is o�en undervalued, and women tend 
to sacrifice their own well-being for their family’s well-being). 
90. Id. at 137 (explaining that in marital bargaining, “the ‘winner[]’ in one round get[s] a satis-
factory outcome that would typically include not only more immediate benefit but also a 
better placing (and greater bargaining power) in the future”; that “finding more ‘productive’ 
employment . . . may . . . contribute not only to immediate well-being but also to acquired 
skill and a better breakdown position for the future”; and that enhanced human capital that 
one might get from a better job “improves one’s breakdown position, threat advantages, and 
perceived contributions within the family, even when these may not have been conscious ob-
jectives”). 
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losses—such as the wages from a job given up to trail a spouse—typically go 
uncompensated.91 
Moreover, redistribution within the family does not remedy the most con-
cerning facet of the employment losses women suffer through mobility: the 
employment losses themselves matter. Work brings unique benefits, especially 
for women, that cannot readily be compensated for in the family.92 Perhaps 
most importantly, when it comes to the critical social goal of advancing sex 
equality in the workplace, how resources are distributed within the family is 
beside the point. 
*** 
Note that the consequences of mobility, both inside and outside the family, 
compound with repeat moves. Perhaps the aim of Schleicher’s proposal to 
move people from low- to high-opportunity places is to situate people in loca-
tions with deep labor markets, which may make them less likely to move in the 
future.93 But this is a significant empirical assumption. Moving to a high-
opportunity place may lead people to become “moving” types who will be more 
likely to move again.94 In any event, the costs discussed above must be factored 
into the welfare and distributional consequences of mobility, even for a single 
move. 
While this Response questions whether the gains from mobility are as great 
as Schleicher suggests, I stop short of claiming that the net costs of mobility 
outweigh its benefits. At the very least, the points raised about welfare and dis-
tribution suggest that the gains from mobility are distributed asymmetrically 
(disproportionately to those who move rather than those le� behind, and to 
husbands rather than wives), such that any thinking about mobility policy 
must pay careful attention to distribution. Moreover, the relative costs and 
benefits of mobility will vary with the circumstances. Some moves (perhaps to 
 
91. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 120-23 (2000) (discussing how family law fails to account for gendered market 
labor and carework dynamics within marriage upon divorce, either through property divi-
sion or alimony). 
92. See Schoenbaum, Coworkers, supra note 38, at 612-14 (explaining how work in general and 
close coworker relationships in particular provide special reprieve from the demands of 
family life, especially for women); Schoenbaum, Intimate Work, supra note 38, at 1182-83 
(same vis-à-vis close worker-customer relationships); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000) (explaining how work is constitutive of citizenship, com-
munity, and personal identity, and citing studies linking work with higher self-esteem in 
women). 
93. In prior work, I have been inclined towards deep labor markets myself for precisely this rea-
son. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1231-35. 
94. See text accompanying supra note 72 for a discussion of different moving types. 
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escape an abusive partner, or to move to a smaller and happier city95) may 
bring especially great benefits. Some moves (perhaps for a young, single per-
son) may impose fewer costs. I have intended to highlight the costs of mobility 
so that those cra�ing policies that will impact location decisions will do so not 
only considering the benefits of mobility, but also its costs. 
i i i . the value of place 
Like his view of the value of relationships, Schleicher also limits his view of 
the value of place to economic productivity. In this regard, he might be over-
stating the value of big cities for bringing economic benefits.96 But Schleicher 
also ignores the impact of place for general welfare metrics, for politics, and for 
other less quantifiable considerations. This Part addresses how Schleicher sim-
ultaneously over- and under-values place. 
As to the economic benefits of place, recent research calls into question the 
wage gains resulting from moving to the types of big cities Schleicher hails.97 
One key study suggests mobility has decreased due to declining wage returns 
to job switching.98 Another study emphasizes the increased flatness of the 
American economy: “labor markets around the country have become more 
similar in the returns they offer to particular skills, so workers need not move 
to a particular place to maximize the return on their idiosyncratic abilities.”99 So 
while Schleicher is worried that the law is standing in the way of people in Mis-
sissippi moving to New York for labor market gains, at least some of the re-
search suggests that people are not making these moves simply because these 
gains do not exist to be had.100 
And if the economic gains are uncertain, the costs—especially in terms of 
higher housing costs—are not. Schleicher would fault restrictive housing and 
zoning laws, among other policies, for the increased housing costs in certain 
 
95. See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text. 
96. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
97. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 83-84 (citing the fact that “lower-skilled workers are not 
moving to high-wage cities and regions” and positing that law and policy “keep[] people 
out of the . . . best job markets”). 
98. See Molloy et al., Declining Migration, supra note 11, at 2; Molloy et al., Job Changing and the 
Decline in Long-Distance Migration in the United States, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 631, 643 (2017) 
(finding that “changes in the labor market are driving the change in migration patterns, ra-
ther than vice versa”). 
99. See Greg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Understanding the Long-Run Decline in Interstate 
Migration, NBER Working Paper No. 18507, at 1 (2013), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w18507.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y943-FSWH]. 
100. See sources cited supra notes 98-99. 
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areas.101 But surely these laws alone are not to blame. Simple supply and de-
mand would lead New York or Silicon Valley to be more expensive than Missis-
sippi or Arkansas. There may be some set of persons for whom restrictive 
housing and zoning laws make the marginal difference between rendering New 
York or Silicon Valley affordable or not. Schleicher does not suggest how large 
a group this is, and the research suggests it is small or nonexistent.102 
Think about these uncertain wage benefits and certain costs for the hypo-
thetical janitor that Schleicher suggests should be moving from Mississippi to 
New York.103 The janitor is not likely to make much more money in New York 
than in Mississippi, but he will have to pay far more in rent.104 Even as a simple 
economic matter, the move starts to look far less appealing. 
Some research also calls into doubt whether moving to the types of high-
opportunity places that Schleicher lauds will make people happier. One study 
finds that the unhappiest counties in the United States are some of the densest, 
and that the happiest counties are primarily rural or a mix of suburban and ru-
ral.105 Another study finds that larger cities are much less happy than smaller 
ones.106 In general, the sixty cities in the United States with populations larger 
than 300,000 people are the least happy cities in the country.107 This may mean 
that precisely the factors that agglomerationists such as Schleicher celebrate for 
 
101. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 114-117. 
102. See Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity, supra note 11, at 221-22 (finding that hous-
ing and zoning regulations are not causing declines in mobility). 
103. See Schleicher, supra note 6, at 83 (“Bankers and technologists continue to move from Mis-
sissippi or Arkansas to New York or Silicon Valley, but few janitors make similar 
moves . . . .”). 
104. It might be that agglomeration brings more benefits for some occupations and industries 
than others. Low-income workers may work disproportionately in occupations and indus-
tries that benefit less from agglomeration. 
105. Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn & Joan Maya Mazelis, Urbanism and Happiness: A Test of Wirth’s 
Theory of Urban Life, 2016 URB. STUD. 1, 10 (analyzing data while controlling for the charac-
teristics of cities themselves, like size and heterogeneity, to find St. Louis, the Bronx, and 
Kings County (Brooklyn) to be the least happy counties, and Douglas County, Colorado 
(outside Denver), Shelby County, Tennessee (outside Memphis), and Johnson County, 
Kansas (outside Kansas City) to be the happiest counties). 
106. Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn, Unhappy Metropolis (When American City Is Too Big), 61 CITIES 144, 
144-45, 148 (2017) (defining happiness in terms of “subjective wellbeing,” which includes 
both life satisfaction and one’s mood, and finding that happiness gradually increases as pop-
ulation size declines). The exception appears to be a large decline in happiness in communi-
ties of around 5,000 to 8,000 people. Id. at 146 fig.2. 
107. Id. 
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their impact on productivity—the density and size of cities—are precisely what 
make people in them less happy.108 
When it comes to city size, unhappiness increases when a city’s population 
reaches hundreds of thousands of people.109 So, “a person does not have to give 
up city living to be happy, she just needs to avoid the biggest cities.”110 None-
theless, Schleicher tends to favor the biggest cities as producing more of the 
benefits of agglomeration.111 Note that one could accept the gains of agglomer-
ation more generally without taking such a narrow view of where these gains 
are generated, particularly considering the happiness tradeoff that living in one 
of the largest cities may entail. 
A few caveats are in order. In the study connecting density to unhappiness, 
the happiest counties were each near a large city, which may allow residents to 
occasionally enjoy the benefits of the city (like the amenities) without the 
costs.112 And these studies show only a correlation between city living and 
happiness, rather than a causal link. It may be that cities attract the types of 
people who are less happy.113 But even if these studies simply reflect that differ-
ent types of people sort into different types of places, this in itself is important 
for Schleicher’s argument: cities may not be for everyone. 
Indeed, precisely because people “ideologically sort into and out of different 
physically defined communities,”114 moving people from some types of places 
to other types of places has political implications. Going back to the Founding, 
place-based political communities have been recognized as important for local 
 
108. Even controlling for factors correlated with density and size (the congestion costs of cities 
such as poverty and stress, as well as race and political affiliation, among others), these stud-
ies continue to find a negative and significant relationship between city size and county den-
sity, on the one hand, and happiness, on the other. See id. at 152 fig.2, 153 fig.3; Okulicz-
Kozaryn & Mazelis, supra note 105, at 6-10. Of course, other factors that were not controlled 
for may also explain the results. 
109. Okulicz-Kozaryn, supra note 106, at 144, 146. 
110. Id. at 148. 
111. While Schleicher does not specifically address this issue, his consistent references to New 
York and Silicon Valley suggest that he believes the real benefits of agglomeration are to be 
had in these cities on the east and west coasts, and that entire regions in the middle and 
south of the country are less productive. 
112. See Richard Florida, The Price of Happiness in Cities, CITYLAB.COM (June 27, 2016), http://
www.citylab.com/equity/2016/06/the-price-of-happiness-in-cities/487823 [http://perma.cc
/SP5P-H7U2]. 
113. See id. (explaining that cities, and especially dense urban neighborhoods, are home to people 
who are “more introverted, introspective, . . . perhaps overly critical,” and “neurotic” than 
are suburbs or rural areas, whereas suburbs and rural areas are home to “more agreeable and 
conscientious types who tend to be happier with their lives”). 
114. Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 108. 
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self-government.115 Large-scale relocation policies could threaten these com-
munities.116 There is also the matter of how place intersects with federalism 
and its benefits, like allowing states to engage in policy experimentation.117 As 
Schleicher sees it, variation in policy across states, rather than being a desirable 
outgrowth of a federal system, hinders interstate mobility.118 Schleicher wants 
to use mobility policy to “forg[e] a unified economy and people from our many 
regions and groups.”119 This “political goal” fails to appreciate the nature of 
separate political and ideological communities defined by state borders as the 
cornerstone of federalism.120 While there is surely disagreement over the role of 
 
115. Id. at 104. 
116. Due to political spillovers and argument pools, once people are in a new location long 
enough, they are likely to change. But this would mean the diminishment of the ideologies 
of the places that people moved away from. See infra note 120 and accompanying text on the 
importance of ideological communities. 
117. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (prais-
ing state governments as the “laboratories” of democracy). 
118. Schleicher cites state variation under Obamacare as one example. See Schleicher, supra note 
6, at 126 & n.218. But the relationship between Obamacare and mobility is mixed. In theory, 
variation in benefit levels and eligibility might hinder mobility for those located in generous 
states, or it might spur mobility to those states from less generous states. Schleicher says 
that “if the higher taxes necessary to fund redistributive spending have any negative effect 
on employment, benefit differentials should limit more moves than they encourage, ceteris 
paribus.” Id. at 126 n.217. But this might not be so if employers make location decisions not 
on the basis of taxes alone, but also based on local policies. We can see this type of employer 
behavior in response to businesses leaving North Carolina a�er it limited transgender rights. 
See David A. Graham, The Business Backlash to North Carolina’s LGBT Law, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
25, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-backlash-to-north-
carolinas-lgbt-non-discrimination-ban/475500 [http://perma.cc/Z8TF-68W6]. Schleicher 
notes that “evidence that people moved to capture greater health benefits following the ex-
pansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act is not strong.” Schleicher, supra note 6, 
at 126 n.218. But this suggests that the health care law has not played much of a role in keep-
ing people in place, either. Cf. David K. Ihrke, Carol S. Faber & William K. Koerber, Geo-
graphical Mobility: 2008 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 16 tbl.7 (2011), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK4V-EESS] (ex-
plaining that 2% of people report moving from one county to another for health reasons). 
119. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 154. 
120. See Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 114-15 (documenting the empirical evidence of con-
tinuing relevance of geography for political communities); Ernest A. Young, The Volk of 
New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal 
System i–ii (Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552866 
[http://perma.cc/YXZ4-Z3HG] (“I conclude that reports of the death of state identity are 
greatly exaggerated.”). 
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diverse state identities in America,121 Schleicher does not address the tension 
between his views and federalism. 
We might recognize a range of other possible benefits to maintaining a di-
verse array of place “types” in America. Writing about rural Oregon, Michelle 
Wilde Anderson—another contributor to this Collection—has suggested sever-
al such benefits, from preserving history and knowledge to making people 
“spiritually and morally more whole through the existence of households and 
environments beyond the hustle of urban materialism.”122 Schleicher questions 
whether supporting residents to “remain adorable repositories of homespun 
knowledge” is “something the rest of us value.”123 
I would like to suggest that one way of coping with mortality is knowing 
that there are things in this world that live beyond us. Preservation provides 
value as much, if not more, for the feelings it generates in us about the kind of 
society we live in than for whatever is preserved.124 Schleicher’s suggestion that 
law should basically make places more destructible—say, for example, by al-
lowing the construction of flimsier buildings that can be torn down more easi-
ly125—poses problems for precisely this reason. We might think there are 
measurable costs to such a proposal: that people will invest less in their homes 
and communities if they are not built to last. Beyond this, it seems downright 
strange to deny what is true for many people: that they have a relationship with 
a place—o�en called a “home”—that is not merely accidental but is integral to 
their identity and well-being, and to their cultural and political values.126 Given 
 
121. See Fontana, Geography, supra note 4, at 114 (describing the disagreement among scholars). 
Of course, there are questions about how much federalism is desirable, whether the relevant 
unit of geography is the state or something else (the city, the region, or another entity), and 
whether there are better ways to achieve the same interests, but the considerations of feder-
alism and the importance of geographic diversity should at least be acknowledged. 
122. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in 
Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465, 500 (2014). 
123. Schleicher, supra note 6, at 145. He questions the value of historic preservation because it 
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all this, we must ask whether we will really be better off if we live in a society 
that treats place like any other market good, as something that is disposable 
when its use value has diminished.127 
conclusion  
I conclude with a word about the title of this Response. When it comes to 
mobility, Schleicher essentially divides people into two classes: the mobile, who 
are able to accrue the benefits of economic dynamism that come from mobility, 
and, as his title suggests, the stuck, who suffer the costs of being trapped in 
place. Richard Florida suggests a third category: “the rooted.”128 These are per-
sons “who are strongly embedded in their communities and choose not to 
[move].”129 While Florida expresses the crucial point that staying put has its 
benefits, his typology still misses something: the costs of mobility outlined in 
this Response can affect even the most mobile among us. Policymakers would 
do well to pay close attention to the costs of mobility and the value of place for 
everyone. 
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